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Abstract
Money markets were severely impaired by the nancial and subsequent
sovereign debt crises. Although the euro money market has been studied
substantially, little has been done for the particular case of Portugal.
This thesis investigates how the Portuguese part of the euro unse-
cured interbank money market was aected by the two consecutive crises.
I constructed and adapted a Furne-based algorithm to identify the loans
traded and settled in TARGET2, in which at least one of the counterpar-
ties is a Portuguese bank. Identied loans have overnight and one-week
maturities. Data shows a clear trend towards a closed interbank money
market. In addition, there is a visibly signicant reduction in the num-
ber of times banks trade in the market, accompanied by a parallel drop
in volumes transacted. Finally, I nd that interest rates rise above the
benchmark and those in the domestic market are persistently higher than
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1 Introduction
The past decades have been marked by increasing globalization in various sec-
tors, in particular of nancial systems. Technological innovations allowed trans-
actions to be settled in real-time and between banks on opposite sides of the
globe. More than ever, it became essential to have well-functioning interbank
money markets to ensure the stability of nancial systems, as well as the smooth
transmission of monetary policy (Heider et al., 2009). However, the nancial
crisis that began in August 2007 in the US severely impacted the unsecured
interbank money market. Its dissemination ultimately disrupted the stability of
the euro interbank money market. The purpose of this thesis is to get a better
understanding of the Portuguese part of the euro unsecured interbank money
market and examine its activity in the aftermath of the crisis.
During the summer 2007, the uncertainty surrounding the US subprime
credit market provoked the suspension of investment funds of BNP Paribas, and
the ECB compensated by injecting liquidity into the system. Notwithstanding,
the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 2008) deteriorated the situation
and central bank intervention was needed. Besides regular monetary policy
operations, the ECB increased liquidity, expanded eligible collateral, performed
more renancing operations, and opted for a xed rate full allotment (FRFA)
policy at the main renancing rate  aiming to completely satisfy banks' demand
for funds at the regular operations at a xed rate equal to the main renancing
rate.
In 2009, conditions in Europe worsened as the euro market reacted to mis-
givings about Greece's government accounts. The sovereign debt crisis rein-
forced the instability in the euro area with its successive requests for nancial
assistance and the uncertainty around both governments and banks, and was re-
sponsible for creating contrasting credit conditions among European countries.
Periphery countries1 experienced increased sovereign risk premia and decreased
cross-border ows, culminating in a segmentation of the euro money market.
In order to support interbank lending and foment money market activity,
the ECB responded with two 3-year LTROs, an increase in available collateral,
and a reduction in the reserve ratio. These measures were reinforced by two
Covered Bond Purchase Programs, since this market is considered to be relevant
for the funding of banks, and the Securities Market Program, with the purpose
of correcting the decient price formation process in the bond market that,
consequentially, aimed to correct the transmission mechanism.
All of this economic instability was a daily presence during my years as
an economics student. Professors were teaching economic theories that were
suddenly being questioned, economic commentators were trying to forecast the
next big event in the nancial system, and I  as a student  was trying to
understand what was happening. This was the motivation for my thesis: to
answer some questions related to the Portuguese part of the euro unsecured
interbank money market and its reaction to the nancial and sovereign debt
1Portugal, Spain, Greece, Ireland and Italy.
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crisis.
First, I constructed a Furne-based algorithm that identies TARGET2 in-
terbank loans in which at least one of the counterparties is a Portuguese bank.
Using the resulting dataset I studied the market in terms of quantities, turnover
and interest rates. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the interbank money mar-
ket froze and that there might have been a shift from longer to shorter matu-
rities. I sought to verify that this was true in the Portuguese case? Did the
international market close their doors to Portuguese banks? How did market
segmentation look like in Portugal?
My results show a clear segmentation in the interbank market beginning
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Cross-border transactions and turnover
suered a substantial reduction and the domestic market became relatively more
signicant after 2009. Moreover, data suggests that in cross-border market
transactions with a Portuguese lender became proportionally more important
during the two years that followed the nancial breakdown. Looking at the
impact on dierences in maturities, in my data it is evident that by the end of
the sample period one-week maturity contracts represented a growing fraction
of transactions and turnover in the market. Finally, market segmentation is
also clear in terms of interest rates. After 2009 interest rates become on average
higher than the benchmark and there are clear dierences between interest rates
paid in the domestic and cross-border markets.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Section 2 presents an overview
on previous literature on the subject under study. Section 3 presents the data
and Section 4 describes the algorithm used. Section 5 provides some descriptive
statistics and results that are proved to be robust in Section 6 Finally, in Section
7 I give some concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
It is in the unsecured interbank money market where banks trade liquidity, i.e.,
banks with a surplus lend to banks with shortages, fullling the overall reserve
requirements of the system. Moreover, it is in these markets where monetary
impulses begin2 , although their signicance goes much further than that. The
importance of interbank markets in distributing liquidity is widely recognized in
the literature. Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) argue that trading in the interbank
market is a way for banks to insure against idiosyncratic shocks. Such shocks
can be a result of uncertainty in the timing of depositors' consumption (Allen
and Gale, 2000) or a result of uncertainty on where to consume (Freixas et
al., 2000). The common feature of these papers is that having well-functioning
interbank markets is important for banks to access liquidity and ultimately to
2The central bank injects liquidity in the overnight unsecured interbank money market,
allowing institutions to endogenously distribute them. Based on expectations theory, longer
term interest rates depend on the expectations market participants have on the future con-
ditions of the overnight market. In such a manner, monetary impulses propagate to other
nancial markets.
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the stability of nancial systems (Cocco et al., 2009).
Other authors have studied the importance of the interbank market with
respect to its bilateral nature and the established relationships between banks.
Banks' relationships are relevant to determine the amount of liquidity in the
market and their access to it (Cocco et al., 2009). They also inuence pric-
ing conditions in the market, since repeated interactions lead to a cooperation
outcome among banks where those with larger imbalances end up trading at
more favorable prices than they would otherwise (Cocco et al., 2009; Carlin
et al., 2007). Moreover, smaller banks and banks with a higher proportion of
non-performing loans tend to rely on relationships in the domestic market be-
cause these have been developed over a longer period of time, information on
foreign banks is poorer, and access to cross-border markets is limited (Cocco
et al., 2009; Freixas and Holthaussen, 2005). Finally, larger banks tend to be
net borrowers and pay lower rates while smaller banks tend to be net lenders
receiving lower interest rates (Cocco et al., 2009; Carlin et al., 2007). Larger
banks are able to get better pricing conditions due to their bargaining power 
which increases in periods of crisis (Cocco et al., 2009; Archarya et al., 2008).
The recent nancial collapse disrupted interbank money markets as banks
became reluctant to trade with each other and revealed how these markets are
important for the nancial stability of banks themselves and of nancial systems.
Additionally, it showed how global nancial systems are integrated (Heijmans
et al., 2010). The crisis had its roots in the US market, but a series of events
led an initially regional shock to impact nancial markets all over the world.
In short, the US banking system was changing its traditional model3 into an
originate and distribute banking model in which loans are pooled, tranched
and then resold via securitization 45 (Brunnermeier, 2009). Moreover, there
was also a trend for banks to nance their asset holdings with shorter maturity
instruments and increasingly rely on repo nancing. These changes left US
banks particularly exposed to ceased funding liquidity. In early 2007 defaults
in subprime mortgage began to rise and generated concern over the valuation
of structured products. As a result, the short-term asset-backed commercial
paper market started to freeze. After this period money market participants
became reluctant to lend to each other, and this fear was then exaggerated by
the bank-runs6 on investment banks and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008 (Brunnermeier, 2009).
It is not clear how the crisis propagated to the euro interbank money mar-
ket, but it is known that on August 2007 BNP Paribas suspended redemptions
for three investment funds, alluding to an inability to value structured products
(Brunnermeier, 2009). In order to overcome this freeze in the interbank market,
the EBC injected ¿95 billion in overnight credit. Afterwards, interbank lend-
ing was disturbed in a number of dierent ways. Either lenders in the market
3In which issuing banks hold loans until they are repaid.
4Increasing securitization was accompanied by a decrease in credit quality.
5Brunnermeier, 2009.
6Brunnermeier (2009) states that not rolling over commercial paper is a run on the issuer
of the asset-backed commercial paper.
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were asking for larger amounts of (quality) collateral and/or higher credit risk
premium (ECB, 2010), or borrowers  perceived as being riskier  were not
nding liquidity in the market or were not willing to pay high risk-premium.
As a consequence, there were no opportunities to trade and transactions in the
unsecured interbank money market suered a signicant reduction. In addi-
tion, with the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, dierent credit conditions
were being oered to dierent countries, i.e., country risk became a signicant
part of bank risk (Heijmans et al., 2010). Reis (2014) named this link between
the interbank market and sovereign uncertainty the diabolic loop, which occurs
when commercial banks hold sovereign bonds. In the particular case of the euro
market there were country bonds  Portuguese bonds, French bonds, and so on
 and so each country's commercial banks was holding their own national bonds.
According to Angelini et al. (2011), the rst phases of the crisis were charac-
terized by this liquidity risk on the aggregate level rather than due to concerns
over individual banks. Ultimately, asymmetric information was responsible for
the market freeze and increasing fragmentation of the single nancial market
(Afonso et al., 2011).
From mid-October 2008 onwards, the ECB provided unlimited liquidity to
the system, especially through a full allotment x rate policy. The ECB also
resorted to a number of unconventional monetary policy measures, attempting
to restore stability in the market (Urszula Szczerbowicz, 2012). These measures,
however, did not prevent interbank lending turnover in the unsecured market
to suer a tremendous reduction. Liquid banks could either turn to the safety
of the ECB's deposit facility to store their surpluses or trade in the secured
market. As for illiquid banks, they could full their funding needs directly from
regular monetary policy operations against a wide range of collateral, instead
of nding it by trading in the market (Cappelletti et al., 2011). Such changes
in banks' trading patterns towards a fragmented interbank money market are
what dene market segmentation.
This thesis focuses on the Portuguese part of the euro unsecured money
market by using an extensive database in which all interbank transactions are
registered. The methodology followed uses an algorithm7 rst developed by
Furne in his 1999 paper The Microstructure of the Federal Funds Market which
allowed the identication of overnight payments transferred trough Fedwire8 .
Furne's goal with the construction of the algorithm was to understand the
microstructure of the U.S interbank money market  as suggested by the title 
during the rst quarter of 1998 by using the resulting transaction-level dataset.
In the federal funds market three main rates are recorded every day: the opening
rate (11:00 rate), the closing rate and the eective rate (a value-weighted rate
for the day). Furne uses these three rates as reference when deciding upon
a plausible interval for the interest rate which overnight transactions may lay
7The algorithm will be discussed in more detail in section 4. For now I will only emphasize
some aspects of its construction.
8The RTGS (Real-Time Gross Settlement) system operated by the Federal Reserve.
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down. The interval is a corridor of 50 basis points (bp) above the highest of the
three rates of the day  usually the closing rate  and 50 basis points below the
lowest  usually the opening rate. Finally, Furne also noticed that interbank
lending is usually made in round amounts of over $1 million, selecting only loans
that t this criterion.
Many researchers have used Furne-based algorithms to perform similar ex-
ercises for dierent economies. Farinha and Gaspar (2007) adapted the algo-
rithm to the Portuguese economy in order to assess whether the interbank mar-
ket had a soft integration into the euro area market. In their algorithm they also
used a 50 basis points corridor, but with EONIA9 as the reference rate. Only
loans ending in at least ve zeros above EUR 100 000 were considered, as they
found that for a smaller economy it did not make sense to include only amounts
as large as those used for the US economy. Moreover, Heijmans et al (2010)
describe the microstructure of the Dutch part of the euro market and improve
the algorithm by expanding the maturities captured. Besides overnight trans-
actions, the algorithm selects contracts with maturities up to three months.
Their corridor depends on both EONIA and EURIBOR and for most of the
time period 50 bp above and below the reference rate is enough, temporarily
increasing the lower bound to 100 bp for the after crisis period. In addition to
the corridor around the reference rate they also stipulate a minimum interest
rate of 5 bp and a minimum loan size of EUR 100 000 with 100 000 increments.
Finally, Arciero et al. (2013) study the Eurosystem unsecured money market
for overnight, one week, and monthly maturities up to one year (12 months).
When constructing an interest rate's plausibility area they contemplate dier-
ent corridors depending on the maturity and added that interest rates needed
to be multiples of 1/2 basis point. As they study the Eurosystem market as a
whole and not just a section of the market, the minimum loan size allowed was
of EUR 1 million with increasing increments depending on the amount of the
transaction, starting at 10 000 euros.
Although Portugal can no longer use monetary policy of its own, Banco
de Portugal is responsible for ensuring the implementation of monetary policy
operations at the national level. In doing so, knowing how the Portuguese part
of the unsecured interbank money market responded to the nancial crisis gives
an insight on how the ECB's monetary impulses were embraced by this part of
the economy. Furthermore, such an understanding of the Portuguese economy
may improve the future use of monetary policy instruments during stress times.
Following the work previously developed, this thesis adds to the literature an
adaptation of the algorithm to the recent Portuguese market and lls a gap by
analyzing one of the economies mostly aected by the nancial collapse.
9In the Eurosystem, EONIA and EURIBOR are the reference rates in the interbank market
depending on the maturity of the transaction. They are not exactly the same as the federal
funds rate. In section 3.1.2 I will explain these rates in more detail.
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3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
There are two ways in which banks can lend to each other. They can either trans-
fer the money directly to one another, or they can do it through the medium of
a Real-Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS). In the former case transactions
are only registered on the account books of both institutions and it is virtually
impossible to account for that activity. Furne (1999) states that for the federal
funds case this takes place mainly between very small institutions for which the
major nancial markets are of dicult access. In the latter case, the two sides
agree upon a loan amount, a term, and an interest rate. These transactions are
then registered in a RTGS system usually operated by a central bank.
RTGS systems are a particular case of large value payment systems (LVPS),
and have been subject to huge developments, playing an increasingly important
role in nancial systems and on modern central banking activity. According to
Heijmans et al. (2010), there was a tremendous increase in interbank payments
over the past 30 years that resulted from the integration and globalization of the
nancial sector. Financial institutions mainly settle large value transactions 
including interbank loans  in these systems, and central banks provide liquidity
through their own accounts.
In the Eurosystem all liquidity provisions and monetary policy operations
have to be settled via RTGS systems. In addition, any monetary transfer be-
tween two banks that is not performed exclusively via the institutions' account
books has an entry in those systems. The issue here is that the nature of those
transactions is not specied in these cases. Consequentially, amidst such an
enormous amount of records, interbank loans are dicult to identify.
It is relevant to note that having systems where transactions are settled by
each bank individually and in real time calls for larger liquidity in the market.
For example, a bank can only lend or pay a certain amount to another bank if
enough money is available on its account at the time the transaction is to be
settled. In this environment, it may be the case that a bank cannot pay a loan
because it has not yet been paid by another bank, the so-called gridlocks. In
order to avoid a market freeze due to transaction timing, central banks grant
intraday credit to the market through their own accounts. Usually the central
bank provides liquidity to the bank in need expecting a repayment later that
day. If the repayment is delayed to the day after, this will be considered an
overnight transaction and an interest is added to the amount in debt. In the
European Union these liquidity provisions are collateralized and free of charge.
Finally, it is important to mention that in the euro area there are two LVPS
operating, TARGET2 and EURO1. The dierence between them is that TAR-
GET2 is owned and operated by the Eurosystem while EURO1 Service of EBA
CLEARING is privately owned. EURO1 balances are settled once a day in
TARGET2 via a settlement account held with the European Central Bank.
The following section explains TARGET2 in more detail.
To be able to see changes in the market due to the nancial crisis, the data
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collected begins on the rst business day of January 2005 and ends on the last
business day of December 2013.
3.1.1 TARGET2
Data used in this thesis originated in TARGET210 , the RTGS owned and op-
erated by the Eurosystem. This is an improvement on the system that was
previously at work, TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross
settlement Express Transfer system). The transition from the later system to
the former was implemented in phases beginning in 19 November 2007 and com-
pletely concluded in May 2008 (ECB TARGET Annual Report, 2008). Because
the period under scrutiny begins in January 2005 and ends in December 2013,
data comes from both TARGET and TARGET211 .
The main dierence between the two systems is the fact that TARGET had
a decentralized structure and TARGET2 is a centralized system that uses a
single shared platform. Nevertheless, there are no relevant changes in the type
of information extracted from these systems. They both allow euro payment
services throughout the European Union (EU) and not only among countries
where the currency was adopted. Institutions have to meet strict criteria in
order to have access to the platform, so that consumers and most nancial
and non-nancial rms do not have access to it. Furthermore, the transactions
handled by these systems are the same and include payments directly connected
with central bank operations in which the Eurosystem is involved either on the
recipient or the sender side; the settlement operations of large-value netting
systems operating in euro; and interbank and commercial payments in euro
(ECB TARGET Annual Report 2008), as well as transfers between central banks
connected to TARGET that are part of the European System of Central Banks
(ESCB).
The Portuguese component of TARGET2 is designated as TARGET2-PT
and is managed by Banco de Portugal : the central bank acts as an intermediary
between national nancial institutions and TARGET2. A Portuguese institution
can only be part of TARGET if it fullls TARGET2-PT requirements.
Data originated in these systems has, among other things, information on
the amount transacted, the date and exact time of the transaction, and a Bank
Identier Code (BIC) for both participants. It is important to mention that, in
this system, there are no upper or lower limits on the value of payments.
3.1.2 EONIA AND EURIBOR PANELS
EONIA is the eective overnight reference rate for the euro. It is computed
as a weighted average of all overnight unsecured lending transactions in the in-
terbank market, undertaken in the European Union and European Free Trade
10No data from EURO1 was used.
11From now on I will use TARGET for both systems interchangeably for simplication
purposes.
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Association (EFTA) countries12 . Having information on this rate is funda-
mental to the study of the microstructure of the unsecured interbank money
market because most of the transactions settled in this market are overnight.
For transactions with one week or higher maturities, the reference rate used is
EURIBOR. This is the rate at which Euro interbank term deposits are oered
by and between prime banks within the euro area. According to the ECB
the choice of banks quoting for EURIBOR is based on market criteria13 .
EURIBOR can be used as an ecient and representative reference rate, because
the choice of banks assures the diversication of the euro money market .14
Historical data on both EONIA and one week EURIBOR are used as bench-
mark rates in this thesis.
3.1.3 DATA: PURPOSE
Many dierent types of payments are settled in TARGET. To study the unse-
cured interbank money market, I am only interest in transactions that corre-
spond to interbank loans, and these are only a fragment of the data provided.
When payments are settled no information on the type of transaction it corre-
sponds to is registered. There is also no information on the interest rate agreed
upon in each transaction or on its maturity. Therefore, I constructed an algo-
rithm that allowed me to select only the payments I was interested in. With
that purpose, the relevant information is the identication code of the nancial
institution, date and total amount of the operation. As in the case of Heijmans
et al. (2010), neither the dataset nor the way the algorithm is constructed al-
lows for the identication of rollovers and interest-only payments, and for this
reason these will not gure the nal dataset. Data on EONIA and EURIBOR
was used to construct a plausible interest rate interval for loans' payments. This
will be explained into more detail in Section 4.1.
4 The Algorithm
Before describing the algorithm constructed in this thesis, I will begin by ex-
plaining the one set up by Furne (1999). As already mentioned, Furne (1999)
was the rst to create an algorithm that permitted the extraction of overnight
payments, or a close approximation, from Fedwire. This was designed to select
transactions that corresponded to rounded values going from institution i to
institution j at day t , and in the opposite direction at day t+1 in an equal
amount plus a plausible interest15 (Heijmans et al., 2010). Besides the informa-
tion about the interest rate on the transaction being unknown, dierent banks
12http://www.emmi-benchmarks.eu/euribor-eonia-org/about-eonia.html
13http://www.euribor-ebf.eu/euribor-org/about-euribor.html
14There has been some discussion about the ability of EURIBOR to represent the market.
It is said that banks may misreport the rates at which they trade, consequentially giving
inaccurate signals to the market.
15Notice that t corresponds to a business day and t+1 to the following business day. For
example, if t is a Monday, t+1 is a Tuesday. But if t is a Friday, t+1 is a Monday.
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may end up trading at dierent interest rates even during the same day when
negotiating the terms of a contract. In order to attain the plausibility area,
Furne (1999) dened a corridor of 50 basis points below and above the highest
and the smallest, respectively, of the opening, closing and value-weighted daily
rates of the market, and converted the implicit interest rate in a yearly rate.
Finally, based on anecdotal evidence, he noticed that interbank loans were made
in round amounts, allowing only the selection of rst payments higher than $1
million and that ended in at least ve zeros.
The outline of my algorithm is very similar to the one just described. How-
ever, the U.S. market departs in some ways from the European one, in partic-
ular from the small share to which the Portuguese market corresponds. Also,
I wanted to capture not only overnight transactions, but also payments with
one-week maturity so that I could have a more complete view of the very short
maturities market. In short, I wanted to identify operations that corresponded
to rounded values going from institution i to institution j at day t , and in
the opposite direction at day t+1 or t+7 in an equal amount plus a plausible
interest.
4.1 Step-by-step Construction of the Dataset:Describing
the Algorithm
The rst step was to carefully choose and match all pairwise combinations ij-
ji in day and t+1 or t+7. Basing my decision on the relevant literature, I kept
only the combinations with a rst payment of a rounded amount larger or equal
to EUR 100 000 and multiple of 100 000.
The next phase was to determine the transactions' implicit interest rate
and which of those lied inside a plausibility area. The implicit interest rate is









where Xt is the rst payment,Xt+d is the repayment, and d gives the number
of days it took for the repayment. This is an annualized interest rate, so the
360 comes from EONIA and EURIBOR convention.
Turning to the plausibility areas, in my algorithm I had to consider two
distinct ones: one for the selection of overnight payments, and another for
the selection of one week maturity contracts. The reason for construction two
distinct plausibility areas is because, although both maturities are very short,
each has its own reference rate: the EONIA in the former case and the one-week
EURIBOR for the latter. Given this information, a corridor of 100 bp around
the EONIA and another around the EURIBOR was constructed. Only implicit
interest rates that fell inside the respective corridor would be considered. It is
important to note that if the EONIA and EURIBOR are close to each other,
the corridors may overlap and the algorithm will have multiple matches with
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dierent maturities for the same payment16.
In short, the algorithm picks combinations of loans and refunds that meet
the following criteria:
1. Both payment and repayment were made through TARGET.
2. First payment (Xt ) must be higher or equal to EUR 100 000 and multiple
of 100 000.
3. The repayment must be equal to the rst payment plus a plausible interest:




6− 10 one− week
. β is the interest and depends on the maturity
of the loan.
4. An implicit interest rate derived for each transaction is calculated accord-
ing to the formula in Equation 1 above and must lay inside a 100 bp
interval above and below one of the reference rates.
5. A corridor is built using EONIA and another using EURIBOR according
to the following rule:
(a) Use EONIA if 0 ≤ d ≤ 5
(b) Use EURIBOR if 6 ≤ d ≤ 10
4.2 Multiple Matches
The algorithm is designed in such a way that two main types of multiple matches
may occur. The rst type is intraday17 multiple matches, which can be divided
into three separate categories. There may be the case that one rst payment has
more than one possible refund fullling the algorithm's criteria. Heijmans et
al. (2010) call this a one-to-many (1:M) multiple match. The reversed situation
may also happen, i.e., one repayment at day t+1 may fulll the requirements
for more than one payment at day t  a many-to-one (M:1) multiple match. The
third case is a combination of the previous two, when many loans have more
than one possible repayment matches and vice versa  many-to-many (M:M)
situation.
To solve intraday multiple matches problem, I begun by selecting the pairs
of payments to which the interest rate was closest to the reference rate. If the
problem persisted, I opted for transactions with 1 day or full weeks maturities
( or ). For the two rst types, whenever there were still more than one possible
match, I randomly selected one combination of payments. For the last case I
chose in chronological order. I would keep the rst combination, eliminating all
the other cases in which any of the two payments involved would appear, then
the second, and so on until I exhausted all possibilities.
16This problem will be discussed in further detail in section 4.2
17Following Heijmans et al. (2010) denomination.
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The second type of multiple matches happens when plausibility areas over-
lap, and the same loan may have a repayment that happened one day or seven
days after, and vice versa. Heijmans et al. (2010) states that this happens be-
cause of policies aimed at reducing interest rates. As there is a zero lower bound
on interest rates, decreasing longer term interest rates result in a convergence
between dierent maturities' interest rates.
Inside this type of multiple matches there might also occur dierent cases.
The rst is when the same repayment is a match for payments beginning in
dierent days, i.e., it might be a repayment for an overnight transaction but
also for a one-week maturity. Again, the opposite is also possible, when the
same rst payment has dierent repayments with dierent settlement dates
fullling the criteria. Finally, a combination of the previous two may occur.
Solving this problem involved dierent phases. In the rst phase I opted
for the transactions with a lowest implicit spread relative to its maturity. If
the problem persisted I chose the smaller term transaction. This criteria deci-
sion was based on ECB reports stating that during the crisis the euro market
concentrated on overnight operations.
4.3 Type 1 and Type 2 errors
This section presents some potential problems regarding the loans and matches
picked up by the algorithm, resulting from the way it is constructed and the
type of information in its original form.
Up front, some transactions may fall into the false positive category. A
false positive (also known as type 1 error) happens when a pair of payments
is incorrectly identied as a bank loan. The rst and most obvious reason for
this kind of mistake is when two completely random payments are paired, and
the wider the plausible interest rate interval, the higher the probability this will
occur. Second, the selection between multiple matches discussed in section 4.2 is
an important source of mismatch, particularly when a rst payment is correctly
identied, but has several possible repayment matches such that the incorrect
match survives the selection process. In this case there is no signicant bias on
the characteristics that matter for the present analysis since this would only be
a problem if I had wanted to study individual transactions instead of aggregated
data.
A third source of error is due to the fact that information from TARGET
does not allow me to distinguish whether payments carried out between the two
identied banks actually correspond to an interbank loan or if banks are acting in
the name of a client or another bank18 . Such a situation may bias a transaction
level analysis because to what concerns the size of the bank the results may not
accurately reect the interbank market. However, in an aggregate data context
this does not present an obstacle.
Another type of error may arise, the false negatives (type 2 error). A false
negative is a true interbank loan that was wrongly rejected by the algorithm.
18The bank may be pursuing a foreign bank transaction.
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The main source of this mistake is the strict criteria that has to be satised for a
transaction to be considered part of the unsecured interbank money market. If
the principal of a bank loan is less than EUR 100 000 or is not a multiple of 100
000 it is not selected. In addition, the choice of an interval for the interest rate
is again important in order to avoid these mistakes. In times of high volatility
in interest rates, banks might have agreed upon on an interest that is either
higher or lower than the interval limits.
There is still a potential problem when the interest is not paid simultaneously
with the principal. However, Armantier and Copeland (2012) state this was not
frequent in the fed funds case, even during the crisis period. Making an educated
guess, we can assume this was also infrequent in the euro market. Although
there are some caveats, based on related literature the algorithm gives a good
approximation of the activity in the euro market, and, to this extent, in the
Portuguese part of the unsecured interbank money market.
5 Statistics and Results
The constructed algorithm enables the characterization of the euro unsecured
interbank money market. My description will be made in 3 phases, character-
izing market activity in terms of quantities, turnover and interest rates.
Based on the time division dened by Heijman et al. (2010), I will specify
dierent time periods along this section:
1. Pre-crisis period (I): 01-01-2005 to 30-06-2007
2. Start of turmoil (II): 01-07-2007 to 14-09-2008
3. Period between Lehman Brothers and Europe's sovereign debt crisis (III):
15-09-2008 to 30-06-2009
4. Sovereign debt crisis before Portuguese nancial request (IV): 01-07-2009
to 16-05-2011
5. Portuguese nancial assistance period (V):17-05-2011 to 31-12-2013.
5.1 Market Activity in Quantities
During the nine year period considered in this study the number of transactions
in the market suered a signicant reduction. From 2005 to 2013 there were on
average 42 daily transactions, from which 89% were overnight operations and
only 11% had a one-week contract period. Moreover, another distinction can
be made. Of these 42 daily operations on average, 24% were domestic. We can
clearly visualize the changes in the market by looking at Figure1.
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Figure 1:






































Share of operations in the domestic market
Domestic vs Cross−border
Number of daily operations
Along the period, the daily number of transactions decreased by a signicant
amount and domestic transactions gained expression from 2009 onwards, after
a period when Portuguese banks were almost not trading with each other. In
particular, the average number of daily transactions in period II  representing
the beginning of the turmoil  was 52 from which domestic transactions com-
prised of only 11%. By period V an average of 24 transactions were traded per
day  nearly half the number recorded in period II. This decrease in interbank
loans, combined with an increase in the number of domestic loans, explains
the 55% average share of domestic operations in this last period. This can be
summarized in the following results:
Result 1: There was a substantial decrease in the total number of daily op-
erations.
Result 2: The number of operations between domestic banks increased after
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, increasing its relative importance in the
market - in the last period domestic operations represent on average 55% of
daily transactions.
Looking closely at the cross-border market, it is visible from Figure 2 that
besides the reduction in relative importance of cross-border transactions in the
market, these were also reduced considerably in absolute value. In addition,
there is evidence that Portuguese banks during the periods III and IV actu-
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Cross−border market
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In period I, from the daily average of 44 cross-border operations only 18%
had a Portuguese bank as a lender, but  with an increase in the number of
daily transactions with Portuguese lenders and a reduction in the number of
operations in which a Portuguese bank acted as borrower  this share progres-
sively increased from period to period, and in period III on average 38% of
cross-border transactions had a Portuguese lender. The decreased number of
cross-border operations was then accompanied by a decrease in the share of
Portuguese lenders and in period V on average 11 operations were cross-border
and 27% had a Portuguese lender. Summing up:
Result 3: Before the nancial turmoil transactions in which Portuguese
banks acted as lenders represented 18% of the cross-border market. During pe-
riods III and IV Portuguese banks acted as lenders in 38% and 37% of transac-
tions, respectively.
Still looking at the cross-border market, I identied Portuguese banks' main
trading partners. The number of transactions in which German banks lent to
Portuguese banks was fairly constant along the entire period: after increasing
slightly by the start of period II it remained at almost the same  although
lower  level during periods III and IV. In relative terms, the share of German
banks lending to Portuguese banks steadily increased from 2005 to 2013.
The number of Spanish and British banks lending to Portugal remained fairly
constant, but Spanish banks gained some importance in relative terms during
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2012, the period when most foreign banks were not lending at all to Portuguese
banks. Italy, Ireland, and Belgium follow a very similar pattern, lending to
Portuguese counterparties until the beginning of 2009 and afterwards ceasing
trade with Portuguese banks. This demonstrates how the market froze after
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and how the banking sector was closely
related to countries' sovereign debt. In the same line, according to the ECB's
Euro Money Market Study published in December 2012, banks were acting in
conformity with top management decisions about not trading with banks in
higher risk countries, as was the case of Portugal.
On the borrowing side, Spain, Great Britain, and Greece  and in some
periods France  are the countries that present the highest number of operations
with Portuguese banks. Spanish banks borrowed from Portuguese banks during
the entire period, accounting for the highest percentage of Portuguese loans.
From 2011 onwards the proportion of Spanish partners for the Portuguese cross-
border market increased despite its fall in absolute value. Great Britain also
borrowed from Portugal throughout the nine-year period, as evidenced by the
fact that from 2007 to 2011 (periods II to IV) the number of transactions in
which Portuguese banks were lending to British banks is much higher. As
for Greek banks it is also visible that these kept borrowing from Portuguese
counterparties throughout the entire period, in particular during period IV. If
I exclude intragroup transactions19 the pattern remains the same but at lower
levels. Therefore:
Result 4: From 2009 onwards most countries stopped trading with Portugal,
a trend that worsened after 2012.
Without further inspection, Portuguese banks were  and still are  having
some diculty nding liquidity in the market, especially from foreign coun-
terparties. There are signs of market segmentation in the data that can be
associated with the perceived high risk due to the diabolic loop. Country insta-
bility induced a contraction in the supply of liquidity by foreign counterparties
and increased the relative signicance of Portuguese lending in the international
market during the core period of the turmoil  periods III and IV. This propor-
tionate increase in Portuguese lending during high stress times may be related to
the temporary freeze of the domestic market and the uncertainty towards Por-
tuguese borrowers. Portuguese banks were not trading in the domestic market
and Portuguese banks with excess liquidity would trade it in the international
market.
Looking now at changes in maturity contracts, it seems that before Greece's
nancial assistance program had been approved, shares for each type of contracts
were roughly constant.
19I constructed a proxy for intragroup transactions considering that if the four rst letters
of the BIC code were the same, banks belonged to the same banking group.
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Figure 3:





































Share of one−week operations
Total number of operations
one−week vs overnight
Number of daily operations
In Figure 3 we can see that around 2009 the share of one-week maturity
loans increased a little, representing approximately 20% of transactions, but
before the beginning of 2010 it had already returned to pre-crisis levels. At the
end of the analyzed sample period (period V) it is possible to notice again a
slight increase in the relative importance of longer maturity contracts, but it is
evident that overnight contracts dominated the market during the whole time
period as expected.
In more detail, for period I on average 54 operations took place in the market,
49 (92%) were overnight payments and 4 (8%) had one-week maturity. As
mentioned above the average daily number of transactions decreased steadily
from period to period and overnight payments accompanied this trend. The
average number of one-week contract operations remained rather constant, its
share in the market increased, and that is why we see that modest raise in
its share by the end of the period. In fact, during period V on average 24
transactions were being traded per day from which 3 had one-week maturity. It
is roughly the same number as in the rst period but representing now 14% of
transactions, almost twice the share as before. So:
Result 5: Although the number of operations with one-week maturity remains
constant, its relative importance in the market becomes higher during period V
(accounting for 14% of transactions).
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5.2 Market Activity in Turnover
The evolution of market turnover20 follows the discussion in the previous sub-
section. If we look at Figure 4 we clearly see that daily market turnover steadily
decreased from 2005 to the end of 2013; from period I to period V daily turnover
decreased by 69% on average. This reduction in market turnover was in great
part a result of the contraction in cross-border turnover, especially the turnover
from operations with Portuguese borrowers, which for the same periods fell by
70%, approximately in the same proportion as the overall market. In period I
the average daily turnover of operations with Portuguese borrowers was 4409
million euros; in period V this number dropped to 732 million euros  16% of
the previous value.
Figure 4:









































Total volume of operations Volume of cross−border operations
Volume of operations with PT borrower (cross−border)
Turnover (volume)
Still on the cross-border market and looking at some countries in particular
it is possible to conrm that in fact lending and borrowing turnover decreased
by a great amount. Turnover evolution was very similar to the evolution of
the number of transactions, and the main countries for the analysis remain the
same. Considering turnover on the lending side, it possible to see that until
2009 turnover from foreign banks' lending was more or less constant, although
dierent countries lent dierent amounts. After 2009, fewer and fewer banks
were lending to Portuguese banks. The main exceptions are French, German,
British, and Spanish banks, but even in these cases turnover decreased to almost
zero around 2012. During this period the share of Spanish turnover increased
20Literature denes turnover as the total volume transacted by banks at the end of each
day.
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signicantly since these were roughly the only banks that continued trading
with Portuguese banks.
Looking at turnover on the borrowing side we can see that throughout the en-
tire period Spanish banks borrow the most from Portuguese banks, even though
its average turnover decreased around 69% from period I to period V. Greek
banks also borrowed from Portuguese banks during the entire period  especially
in 2010 and 2011, the period of Greece's nancial assistance program. Although
at rst glance it seems that they borrowed in large amounts, the values are much
lower than that of Spain: for the entire period Greek banks' borrowing turnover
was on average 3% of that of Spanish banks. Finally, British and French banks
also borrowed from Portugal, especially during the core period of the crisis, from
the beginning of 2007 to the end of 2010. In sum:
Result 6: Money market turnover reduced considerably from period I to period
V. This reduction is associated with a fall in turnover in the cross-border market.
As in the previous subsection it is possible to nd some market segmentation.
There is evidence that the domestic market became proportionately more im-
portant with the considerable reduction in cross-border turnover. Moreover, on
the lending side, the countries that continued their relationship with Portuguese
banks were essentially core countries, while on the borrowing side partners were
mainly periphery countries facing similar nancial struggles, with the exception
of Great Britain and France. This segmentation may reect the impact of ad-
verse selection in the unsecured interbank money market in the crisis period,
or the fact that having long-standing relationships with the same banks allow
better pricing conditions.
When classifying the market in terms of overnight and one-week maturities
it is possible to relate the overall market reduction with the turnover develop-
ments of the overnight market. From Figure 5, we see a striking rise in daily
turnover for the longer maturity between 2010 and 2012, as well as its escalat-
ing importance in relative terms. This is somewhat puzzling because if banks
wanted to limit their exposure to risk, they should have been trading higher
amounts in the overnight market. This period corresponds to the one when the
cross-border market shows the highest degree of closeness, meaning that this
higher turnover in the longer term market took place essentially in the domes-
tic market. Keeping in mind that from period I to period V the average daily
number of one-week maturity transactions remained fairly constant, what might
justify this phenomena is the fact that banks were reluctant to trade, reducing
their overall activity in the market. Since they were trading fewer times, it
might have been the case that when they did trade they would chose to trade
in higher amounts in one-week contracts instead of trading on the overnight
market. Another possible explanation is that increased intermediation by the
central bank caused individual banks to pay less attention to treasury man-
agement, decreasing the relative importance of the overnight market in favor
of the one-week maturity one. We can also conjecture that another reason for
18
this increase in turnover could be the change from longer maturity loans  e.g.
three-month maturity loans  to shorter period ones. However, my algorithm
does not allow me to prove this last statement as it does not identify longer
term loan contracts.
Figure 5:









































Total volume of operations
Volume of overnight operations
Volume of one−week maturity operations
Turnover (volume)
Result 7: Signicant increase of turnover in one-week maturity operations
from 2010 to 2012.
5.3 Market Interest Rates
Interest rates are crucial for a complete understanding of the interbank market.
In this section I will divide the analysis. First I will describe the overnight mar-
ket and then the market for one-week maturity contracts since each of these mar-
kets has a dierent reference rate: the EONIA is the benchmark for overnight
operations and the one-week EURIBOR for one-week loans.
The top panel in Figure 6 depicts the ECB's deposit and marginal rates,
EONIA and the daily overnight rates found by the algorithm for domestic and
cross-border operations. As a result of the way the algorithm is constructed,
implicit interest rates are very close to the EONIA. Even though in the rst part
of the sample  until the Lehman Brother's collapse (periods I and II)  interest
rates captured do not show much variation around the EONIA, beginning in
2009 the dispersion becomes higher, notably for domestic interest rates. We can
compare the spreads of the weighted average interest rates found in relation to
19
the EONIA. It is clear that from 2010 onwards both rates  domestic and cross-
border market  start to depart from the EONIA. As it was expected, interest
rates paid become higher than the benchmark for both types of transactions.
A peculiar aspect is that on average interest rates in the domestic market are
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Spreads
As the cross-border market is of particular interest, I also compare the
spreads of weighted average interest rates of operations with Portuguese bor-
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rowers to those with a Portuguese lender. Both interest rates follow very similar
paths until 2008. Afterwards operations with a Portuguese borrower have, on
average, higher interest rates. The exception is the period from 2010 to mid-2011
in which transactions with a Portuguese lender are on average more expensive21
.
Looking at the one-week maturity market, its developments are very similar
to the ones in the overnight market. Again, identied interest rates for the do-
mestic and cross-border markets follow one-week EURIBOR closely, especially
for the period prior to the crisis. In this case I nd that the dispersion of interest
rates for the nancial crisis period to be higher than in the previous case. For the
one-week maturity market spreads in the domestic market for the period right
after the Lehman Brothers' collapse are smaller than for the overnight case. In
addition, in this market, on average, interest rates for both domestic and cross-
border transactions are closer by the end of the sample. The period when the
turnover in the one-week maturity period increases is roughly the same when
interest rates in the domestic market are below EURIBOR, meaning that the
increased turnover may have been a result of cheaper one week loans. Therefore
we can say that:
Figure 7:
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Deposit facility Rate Marginal lending facility Rate
EURIBOR
One−week maturity
Policy and Money market interest rates
Result 8: Interest rates of overnight and one-week maturity operations in-
creased above the benchmark after the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy for both the
21Check Figure 16 in the appendix which shows the spread between the implicit interest
rate of cross-border transactions with a Portuguese lender and the implicit interest rate of
cross-border transactions with a Portuguese borrower.
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domestic and cross-border markets.
After inspecting the developments in terms of interest rates I take a step fur-
ther in trying to understand what happened in the unsecured interbank market.
From 2005 until the nancial collapse interest rates in both domestic and cross-
border markets are really close to each other and close to EONIA/EURIBOR.
As the euro market is a nancially integrated market, it seems reasonable to
assume that during this period it was acting as a single free market. How-
ever, the departure from EONIA/EURIBOR  in line with the decrease in the
number and turnover of transactions  shows that markets were disrupted and
uncertainty in counterparties increased as interest rates became higher than
benchmarks. The divergence between domestic and cross-border rates, as well
as the divergence among cross-border interest rates, indicates that the once
single market may have become segmented into three dierent markets, since
otherwise interest rates would have remained close because of arbitrage. These
three markets can be classied as the domestic market, the cross-border mar-
ket with Portuguese lenders, and the cross-border with Portuguese borrower.
If we think of each market as a having a typical demand and supply function
of liquidity, the increase in prices and decrease in quantities is explained by a
contraction of the supply. In the rst and second cases Portuguese banks largely
had liquidity shortages and banks with excess liquidity might have chosen to
deposit it in the ECB's overnight deposit, contracting the supply of liquidity in
both markets. In the last case, foreign banks did not rely on Portuguese banks,
reducing the amount of liquidity available to them in the market22.
The market with the highest price is the domestic one. Assuming banks could
decide in which market to trade, why would Portuguese banks keep borrowing
in the more expensive domestic market? One answer can be explained in part
by the uncertainty foreign banks had about Portuguese banks, meaning that in
fact these banks would probably like to move to the cross-border market but
were not nding supply there.
On the other hand, why would Portuguese banks lend in the cross-border
market if they could so at a higher price in the domestic market? Considering
that prices are signaling counterparty risk, this means some banks were not will-
ing to take higher risk not even at higher prices. Furthermore, liquid banks may
be using the extra liquidity provided by the ECB to earn some interest in safe
bets, asking for lower interest rates to foreign counterparties. Looking at the
problem from another, yet complementary, perspective, asymmetric information
in the market can be responsible for an inaccurate perception of risks. Domestic
banks have more information about one another due to proximity and longer re-
lationships, and so they are more aware of each others' risk. On the other hand,
information on foreign counterparties is coarse, and it may be that Portuguese
22It is also reasonable to assume some increase in the demand for liquidity, but these should
not be enough to oset the contraction of supply.
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banks perceive foreign banks as less risky, justifying price dierences. Last but
not least, the presence of Portuguese banks' lending in the cross-border market
can be a sign of adverse selection in which the banks able to raise funds in the
international market are also the most reliable ones.
6 Robustness
The reliability of the results presented in the previous section depends on the
precision of the algorithm in identifying overnight and one-week maturity inter-
bank loans. The only way to validate my algorithm is by matching the identied
interbank loans with information on transaction-level data of the payments that
actually took place in the interbank money market. However, that information
does not exist, and consequentially, I am not able to perform a validation test
to my algorithm.
Nevertheless, some authors have performed validation tests on Furne-based
algorithms for parts of the euro money market. Arciero et al. (2013) used the
Italian MID platform and De Frutos et al. (2013) the Spanish MID platform.
Both concluded that up to three-month maturities the algorithm is very reliable
for identifying TARGET2 interbank loans. Moreover, the nal MaRs Report
also supports the accuracy of the algorithm for the euro area. Therefore, it
is safe to argue that my results present a good picture of the activity in the
Portuguese part of the euro unsecured interbank money market.
7 Conclusions
In this thesis I developed an algorithm that identies unsecured interbank money
market loans that go through TARGET and in which at least one of the coun-
terparties is a bank registered in Portugal. My algorithm is an extension of the
one set up by Furne (1999) and Demiralp et al.(2004), and a particular case of
the ones built up by Heijmans et al. (2010) and Arciero et al. (2013), as it is
design to capture overnight and one-week maturity contracts in the Portuguese
part of the money market. The construction of the algorithm may generate
some errors, namely type 1 and type 2 errors, and it fails to identify rollovers or
interest only payments. However, based on validation tests performed by other
authors for parts of the euro market to which they have information on the real
transactions, it seems reasonable to assume the algorithm provides a reliable
dataset of the microstructure of the Portuguese interbank money market. In
addition, the algorithm limitations do not aect the type of analysis I executed.
The results show that there was a signicant reduction in the overnight un-
secured interbank money market, not only in absolute terms but also comparing
with the activity in the longer maturity market: after the Portuguese request
for nancial assistance, overnight turnover decreased by 64% from before the
turmoil. Moreover, data also shows a clear segmentation between the domes-
tic and cross-border market. After 2009 foreign banks stopped trading with
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Portugal due to the perceived higher risk of Portuguese banks. The exceptions
were Germany, Great Britain, France and Spain on the lending side, and mainly
Spain and Greece on the borrowing side. During the core period of the crisis
British banks also borrowed from Portuguese banks and there is also an increase
in the relative importance of Portuguese lenders in the market during this pe-
riod, which possibly only represents the reduced borrowing opportunities for
Portugal.
The algorithm provides some information on interest rates. I conclude that
prices charged in the domestic and in the cross-border market had converged
before the nancial collapse, implying that the Portuguese part of the unsecured
interbank money market was integrated in the overall euro money market. Af-
terwards, prices increased in both markets and for both maturities, indicating
some market segmentation. Finally, interest rates in the domestic market are
higher than interest rates for markets with Portuguese lenders and markets
with Portuguese borrowers, likely due to adverse selection phenomena, as the
Portuguese banks that were able to lend abroad are the most reliable ones.
Having such an algorithm may prove useful for monitoring the Portuguese
interbank money market. Interbank loans are registered in RTGS systems and
their nature is not specied. Having an approximation of the activity in the
interbank market facilitates and may help reduce the risk that local failures
threaten the stability of nancial institutions, markets, and ultimately the trans-
mission channel for monetary policy.
The algorithm may also have other uses, opening a wide range of further
research. First, combining the algorithm's payment data with bank-level in-
formation would allow us to study the eect unconventional monetary policy
measures had on interbank markets. Understanding how the market responded
to these impulses during stress times may improve monetary policy's design to-
wards a more ecient mechanism. Another application could come from com-
bining this data with bank-level accounting information which would allow us to
study how bank-specic characteristics aect transactions, namely how dierent
sized banks respond to interbank market changes during a crisis. Additionally
by applying network theory to this algorithm, it will be possible to analyze the
interconnectedness in the interbank market and the channels through which sys-
temic risk propagates. Finally, there is still room for improving the algorithm,
constantly adapting it to money market developments.
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